Religious Protection

Religious Protection

Religious rights are protected by the federal and state constitutions as well as federal and state laws. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and state counterparts protect an individual's right to the free exercise of religion and prevent governments from establishing a particular religion or endorsing religious exercise. Federal and state laws, including the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Religious Freedom of Restoration Act (RFRA), create statutory causes of actions against governmental entities for violations of religious rights.

Court Cases Involving Historic Religious Properties

Over the past two decades, the National Trust staff have compiled  a list of of federal and state legal cases  involving the application of historic preservation regulations to the historic houses of worship.


First Amendment

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech..." The Establishment Clause generally requires government neutrality toward religion. It prohibits laws that advance religion or express favoritism toward religion or that foster "an excessive entanglement" with religion. Thus, for example, a law that provides special funding for religious schools or exempts religious property from building code requirements may be found to violate the Establishment Clause.

The Free Exercise Clause, on the other hand, prohibits governmental entities from substantially burdening the free exercise of religion, unless the government can establish that the burden is "the least restrictive means" of furthering a "compelling governmental interest" such as public health or safety. However, "neutral laws of general applicability" need not be justified by a "compelling governmental interest," even if "the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." A law designed to promote secular objectives, for example, such as protecting historic buildings from demolition, would not violate the free exercise clause even though a congregation may be required to spend additional money to rehabilitate a historic house of worship.

While relatively few preservation-related cases have been brought under the First Amendment, claims may arise in response to the designation and regulation of historic religious property.

Free Exercise of Religion

While strong arguments exist in support of the regulation of historic religious property, the law in this area is still evolving. Although not always consistent, the few court decisions addressing this question in the context of preservation laws provide some guiding principles.

The controlling U.S. Supreme Court case on the free exercise issue is Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In its decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed prior case law which held that a government may not "substantially burden" an individual's free exercise of religion unless the government can establish that the burden is the "least restrictive means" of furthering a "compelling governmental interest." The Supreme Court, however, also carved out a major exception to that rule – "neutral laws of general applicability" need not be justified by a "compelling state interest" even if they substantially burden the exercise of religion.

Four distinct issues are typically addressed in considering the constitutionality of the regulation of historic religious properties in view of Smith. First, what is the religious basis for asserting a free exercise violation? Second, is the law a "neutral law of general applicability?" If the law is found not to be neutral or generally applicable, then it must be determined whether, third, the law or action "substantially burdens" the free exercise of religion. Finally, one must consider whether the action was taken in "furtherance of a compelling state interest," and, if so, whether the action is "the least restrictive means" of furthering that interest. Because historic preservation is generally not viewed as a compelling state interest, free exercise cases in this area are lost once a court has determined that the free exercise of religion has been substantially burdened.

Religious Basis for Objection

The Supreme Court has made clear that the individual or institution seeking exemption from governmental laws under the First Amendment must first show that the conduct in question is grounded in religious belief. In other words, the question of whether a religious property owner has a viable free exercise claim depends on the religious nature of the objection. Not every change that a religious property owner desires to make to its property implicates the Free Exercise Clause. Alterations to historic religious property based on practical considerations rather than theological choice warrant no more protection than changes to secular property. For example, courts have ruled that maximizing the value of real estate owned by religious organizations or covering a historic house of worship with vinyl siding does not constitute "exercise of religion."

Although distinguishing between religious and non-religious changes to historic religious property may be difficult, determinations are generally based on whether a proposed change stems from a "sincerely held belief," such as the need to replace a cruciform-shaped window with the Star of David. If a religious property owner establishes that the belief is "sincerely held" and the change is "religious in character," then the government must accept those assertions as true even if it considers them to be illogical or incomprehensible.

Neutral Law of General Applicability

Historic preservation laws are generally viewed as "neutral laws of general applicability." The object of such laws is to promote the preservation of historic properties, rather than the suppression of religious conduct. Moreover, they seek to preserve all historic properties, whether secular or religious, and without regard to the religious orientation of the property owner. For case examples, see the following:

  • Rector, Warden & Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. New York City, 914 F.2d 348 (2d. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991): New York City's landmark law is neutral law of general applicability;
  • First Church of Christ v. Ridgefield Historic District Comm'n, 737 A. 2d 989 (Conn. App. 1999): Ridgefield historic preservation ordinance is neutral law of general applicability;
  • City of Ypsilanti v. First Presbyterian Church of Ypsilanti, No. 191397 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998): Ypsilanti preservation ordinance is "a law of general application which does not burden [the church] any more than other citizens, let alone burden [the church] because of its religious beliefs;"
  • Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, No. CV-08-996-PHX-NVW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7225 (D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2009): Finding that the city was guided by neutral and generally applicable principles in reviewing and ultimately denying a conditional use permit application to operate a church on the city's historic main street.

The Supreme Court in Smith, however, recognized two limitations on its general rule that substantial burdens on the free exercise of religion need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest: (1) where the government "has in place a system of individual exemptions;" and (2) where the substantial burden involves another constitutionally protected right. There is little guidance on the law in this area. Constitutional experts maintain that exceptions under historic preservation laws, such as "economic hardship provisions," do not trigger the "individualized exemptions" limitation because they do not invite "religiously motivated discrimination." While some religious property owners have argued that historic preservation laws fall into the "hybrid" constitutional rights limitation on the basis that such laws infringe on both free exercise and free speech rights, no court has applied this limitation in the context of historic properties.

Substantial Burden on Religion

Court decisions addressing this issue are both modest in number and conflicting in result. Nonetheless, the prevailing view is that enforcement of historic preservation laws against historic religious property owners does not impose a "substantial burden on religion." In Rectors, Wardens & Members of St. Bartholomew's Church v. New York City, 914 F.2d 348 (1990), the leading federal court case on this issue, the Second Circuit, found that the application of the landmark law to a church-owned structure did not impose an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion, even though the law "drastically restricted the church's ability to raise revenues to carry out its various charitable and ministerial programs." See also City of Ypsilanti v. First Presbyterian Church of Ypsilanti, No. 191397 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998), in which the Michigan Court of Appeals recognized that the alleged "burdens are still only incidental effects of the ordinance...[and do] not burden [the religious organization] any more than other citizens, let alone the religious organization because of its religious beliefs;" and Diocese of Toledo v. Toledo City-Lucas County Plan Commissions, Case No. 97-3710 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Mar. 31, 1998), in which the church failed to establish that denial of permit to demolish a historic house to construct a parking lot amounted to "an undue burden on the Diocese's right to freely exercise religion" or that "the denial prevents the Diocese from continuing existing charitable and religious activities."

Note that some courts have dismissed free exercise claims on the basis that the claim is not yet "ripe" for review, meaning that judicial review would be premature because the jurisdiction being sued has not had the opportunity to make a final, concrete decision on what alterations or other actions it will permit a religious entity to make on the subject property. There is still some potential that a constitutional violation will not occur. See Metropolitan Baptist Church v. Consumer Affairs, 718 A.2d 119 (D.C. 1998), and Church of Saint Paul & Saint Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1986).

Compelling State Interest

In the event that a preservation law is deemed "non-neutral" or not of "general applicability," and the regulation of historic religious property would result in a "substantial burden" on the free exercise of religion, any restrictions under the law must be justified by the virtually insurmountable "compelling state interest" test, which only applies to government interests such as public safety. No court thus far has ruled that historic preservation meets that test.

The Washington Cases

In a trilogy of cases from the State of Washington, the Washington Supreme Court has either construed the first amendment more restrictively against the government or recognized additional protections for historic religious property owners beyond those guaranteed by the federal constitution. Among other things, the Washington court found that Seattle's preservation law was not a neutral law of general applicability and that even the nomination of religious-owned historic property violates the free exercise clause. These decisions reflect a marked departure from controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the free exercise clause.

Establishment of Religion

In addition to prohibiting substantial burdens on the free exercise of religion stemming from non-neutral, generally applicable laws, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution also prohibits the establishment of religion. This prohibition does more than preclude the federal government or a state from setting up an "official" church. It also prohibits the adoption of laws that aid religion, or that give preference to one religion over another religion, or religion in general over non-religion. In essence, government must be neutral toward religion.

The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause work in tandem with each other, striving for the appropriate balance between church and state. On the one hand, the government may not enact laws or fund programs that are favorable to, or which give preference to, religious entities. On the other hand, government may not enact laws or fund programs that discriminate against religious entities. An issue in many Establishment Clause cases, in effect, is where to draw the line between religious preference and religious exercise. For example, under what circumstances may a governmental entity fund the restoration of a historic church?

While the answer is rarely clear cut, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided some guidance on how to evaluate Establishment Clause claims. To survive constitutional scrutiny, the challenged governmental action or program must (1) serve a secular governmental purpose, and (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). To avoid having an impermissible "primary effect," the governmental action must not "(1) result in governmental indoctrination; (2) define its recipients by reference to religion; or (3) create an excessive entanglement." (Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 1997).

In interpreting these requirements, the Supreme Court has said that government may "accommodate" religion, but only where accommodation is necessary to remove governmental intrusions into personal religious beliefs or practice (which, in turn, may require analysis under the Free Exercise Clause). Moreover, although a law may incidentally benefit religion, it must have a secular effect. Finally, consistent with this approach, the Court has recognized that some intermingling between church and state is inevitable in today's world. However, excessive entanglement is impermissible. Governmental actions that require substantial intrusion into the doctrinal affairs of religious entities are not allowed.

Applying these factors, a federal district court upheld city funding of repairs and improvements for three historic churches in Detroit against an Establishment Clause claim. See American Atheists v. City of Detroit Downtown Development Authority, 503 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Mich. 2007).

Statutory Protections

Religious rights are also protected by federal and state laws. The primary law at the federal level is the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Signed into law in 2000, this act prohibits any government from enacting or applying land use laws, including historic preservation laws, to property owned or used by individuals or religious institutions in a manner that would "substantially burden" religious exercise without a compelling state interest, such as public health and safety. RLUIPA also requires "equal treatment" of religious and non-religious entities and prohibits discrimination against religious institutions or assemblies. Successful claimants are entitled to attorneys' fees and possibly damages.

Although RLUIPA applies to a broad range of religious activity, it does not provide immunity from historic preservation and other land use laws. Courts have uniformly rejected attempts to make the term "substantial burden" meaningless, by finding that it applies to broad range of effects that inhibit or constrain religious exercise. Rather, they view the "substantial burden" requirement as an important limitation on the law's scope and have dismissed claims where the burdens on religious exercise have been incidental or similar to the type of burdens experienced by any property owner. No single standard for measuring "substantial burden," has been adopted. Most federal appeals courts agree, however, that substantial burden must be interpreted in a manner consistent with First Amendment law and thus require a showing of coercion or significant restraint on religious exercise.

Finally, governmental entities should be aware that even if a claimant establishes a substantial burden on religious exercise, accommodations made by local entity to relieve the burden must be accepted unless they are "unreasonable" or "ineffective." This is an important limitation in matters involving historic properties, because it should lead to negotiations that result in preservation-based solutions.

While RLUIPA has had a noticeable chilling effect on local government activities involving historic properties, only a handful of preservation case has been reported thus far. In Episcopal Student Foundation v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691(E.D. Mich. 2004), a federal district court dismissed a RLUIPA claim because the preservation commission's denial of a permit to demolish a student worship facility did not substantially burden the organization's free exercise rights. The court reasoned that the commission's action did not "force [the organization] to choose between pursuing its religious beliefs and incurring criminal penalties or forgoing government benefits." It also did not prevent the organization "from engaging in religious worship, or other religious activities."

Likewise, in Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Peoria, No. 07-cv-1029 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009), a federal court ruled that the city had not violated RLUIPA in designating and then denying a permit to demolish a church-owned apartment building to construct a "family life center." There the court reasoned that the city's actions did not rise to the level of substantial burden on religious exercise, notwithstanding alleged increases in costs totaling $1.1 million, where the city's action only affected one building and one location on the church campus and did not prevent the church from "continuing its religious ministries."

The vast majority of court challenges brought under RLUIPA, to date, have primarily focused on land use challenges involving the exclusion of religious properties from certain locations or discriminatory actions by prison officials in matters involving institutionalized persons.

By way of background, RLUIPA was adopted in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), that the act's predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., was unconstitutional as applied to the states. Among other things, the Court found that Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting RFRA, by mandating that the Free Exercise Clause afford more protection than that required by the Supreme Court under Employment Division v. Smith. (Note that RFRA is still applied to federal agency actions. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 2006).

As with RFRA, RLUIPA was adopted in response to the Court's ruling in Smith. Although the law's constitutionality as applied to challenges to state or local land use and preservation actions has not been resolved, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the law as applied under its "institutionalized persons" prong in 2005. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).

A number of states have enacted varying forms of RFRA, enabling religious property owners to seek redress from state and local governments that substantially burden their religious rights without a compelling governmental reason. Although preservation actions have been challenged in court under both federal and state RFRA grounds, no court has ruled in favor of a religious property owner on such grounds. See First Church of Christ v. Historic District Commission, 737 A.2d 989 (Conn. App. 1999), cert. denied, 742 A.2d 358 (Conn. 1999), in which a denial was upheld of an application to install vinyl siding on historic church against state RFRA claim. See also Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, No. CV-08-996-PHX-NVW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7225 (D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2009), in which a denial was upheld of conditional use permit application to operate church on the city's historic main street under the Arizona Religious Freedom Restoration Act.